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OVERREGULATION OF HEALTH CARE:
MUSINGS ON DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION
THEORY
LESLEY H. CURTIS, PH.D.,* AND KEVIN A. SCHULMAN, M.D.**
I
INTRODUCTION
Health care costs in the United States are rising at an extraordinary rate.1
The escalation has been attributed to a variety of factors, including the
managed-care backlash,2 consumer choice,3 consumerism in an aging society,4
and insufficient competition in the health care industry.5 In addition, anecdotal
evidence suggests that regulatory control may be a significant driver of health
In this paper, we hope to expand on the discussion of
care costs.6
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1. See Sarah Lueck, Health-Care Spending Rises 8.7%, Fastest Expansion in 10 Years, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 8, 2003, at D2; Robert Pear, Spending on Health Care Increased Sharply in 2001, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 8, 2003, at A12.
2. See James C. Robinson, The End of Managed Care, 285 JAMA 2622, 2622–28 (2001) (detailing
the departure from an economically successful but politically unpopular model of managed care); Carol
Gentry, UnitedHealth Move on Reviews is Seen as Industry Watershed, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 1999, at
B6; Jonathan Oberlander, The U.S. Health Care System: On a Road to Nowhere?, 167 CAN. MED.
ASS'N J. 163, 166–68 (2002).
3. See Robinson, supra note 2.
4. See Marilyn Moon, Medicare, 344 NEW ENG. J. MED. 928, 928 (2001) (detailing the growth in
life expectancy, especially among those who have already reached a mature age).
5. See Thomas Bodenheimer, High and Rising Health Care Costs, Part 1: Seeking an Explanation,
142 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 847, 850 (2005).
6. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, THE FACTORS FUELING RISING HEALTHCARE COSTS 3
(2002), available at http://www.aahp.org/InternalLinks/PwCFinalReport.pdf (claiming that fifteen
percent of the total increase in health care premiums is a result of government mandates and
regulation); GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HEALTH INSURANCE REGULATION: VARYING STATE
REQUIREMENTS AFFECT COST OF INSURANCE 2 (1996) (concluding that state health insurance
regulations add costs to insured health plans); See also SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMM. ON
REGULATORY REFORM, BRINGING COMMON SENSE TO HEALTH CARE REGULATIONS 10 (2002),
available at http://www.rwhc.com/papers/DHHS.RRAC.11.21.02.Report.pdf.
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“overregulation” by Havighurst and Richman7 by considering in particular some
of the effects that regulatory controls may have on innovation in the health
sector.
For the purpose of this discussion, we adopt a definition of regulatory
controls (“regulations”) offered by Berenson8 and extend it to private and
public entities performing the same function. Regulatory-control activities
involve applying external rules in a consistent, uniform, and mechanistic way to
patients and providers. For example, strictly enforcing a defined benefit
package and paying physicians according to a fixed-fee schedule are regulatory
tools.9 Regulations, whether aimed at improving quality or controlling prices,
may exert upward pressure on costs in a variety of ways.10 First, documentation
of compliance with regulations often requires substantial paperwork. A recent
survey by the American Medical Association suggests that physicians may
spend one hour completing Medicare paperwork for every four hours of patient
care.11
Second, regulations in one area may conflict with regulatory
requirements in another, resulting in confusion and duplication of effort.12 For
example, a Medicare beneficiary may have the same information collected by as
many as five care providers (for example, hospitals, physicians, home health,
nursing home, and durable medical equipment). Third, directives that
micromanage processes of care become obsolete as health care technology and
the health care delivery system evolve. According to one estimate, more than
132,000 pages of governmental rules, requirements, guidelines, and directives
currently govern the delivery of health care.13
In addition, regulations may profoundly affect costs by stifling innovation in
service delivery and quality improvement.14 Rules designed to protect
consumers may have the unintended consequence of preventing good-quality,
lower-cost alternatives from reaching the marketplace. In this article, we draw
on the theory of disruptive innovation to explore this unintended consequence
of regulation—specifically, how regulation of the primary-care delivery system
may increase costs without providing improvements in quality. First, we
present the theory of disruptive innovation and apply it to the heavily regulated
health care market. Second, we discuss disruptive innovation in the primary-

7. Clark C. Havighurst & Barak D. Richman, Distributive Injustice(s) in American Health Care, 69
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 50–71 (Autumn 2006).
8. Robert A. Berenson, A Physician’s View of Managed Care, HEALTH AFF., Winter 1991, at 106,
110.
9. Id.
10. Christopher J. Conover, Health Care Regulation: A $169 Billion Hidden Tax, 527 POL'Y
ANALYSIS 1, 1 (2004).
11. Medicare Reform: Bringing Regulatory Relief to Beneficiaries: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Health of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 107th Cong. 12 (2001) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement
of Richard F. Corlin, President-elect, American Medical Association).
12. See SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMM., supra note 6, at 13.
13. Hearings, supra note 11, at 134–35 (letter and attachment of Bruce M. Kelly, director of
government relations, Mayo Foundation).
14. SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMM., supra note 6, at 48.
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care delivery system, using diabetes care as an example. Finally, we discuss the
challenges of making the regulatory environment more hospitable to innovation
in a way that improves the quality and reduces the costs of health care.
II
DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION THEORY
Disruptive innovation—proposed by Christensen15 and further explicated in
an important paper by Macher and Richman16—attempts to explain why some
companies fail to stay atop their industries when faced with certain types of
market and technological change.
The theory assumes that consumer
Early
preferences for individual technologies are widely distributed.17
innovators enter markets with basic products that meet the needs of a segment
of the market.18 Over time, innovators improve the product’s capabilities
(“sustaining innovation”) to meet the demands of high-end consumers who
offer potentially higher margins and more profitable markets.19 Business
models (and products within an individual firm) typically evolve by continuing
to meet the needs of those customers through high-end innovation. The
resulting higher-quality products serve the needs of the most lucrative segments
of the market.20
Christensen argues, however, that “sustaining innovation” leads firms to
develop products that possess capabilities far beyond what the average
consumer desires or can absorb (Figure 1).21 The overdeveloped product
creates an opportunity for a new product, process, or business model—one
initially offering the most basic features—to enter the market. “Disruptive
innovation” occurs when this new product, entering the market at a lower level
of sophistication, rapidly progresses to meet the needs of the majority of
consumers in the marketplace and, as a result, captures market share from wellestablished firms.22
III
DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION IN THE HEALTH CARE SECTOR
Does the theory of disruptive innovation apply to a highly regulated market
like health care? A key tenet of Christensen’s theory is that a firm introduces
into the market a new business model offering products with basic features, thus
securing a substantial portion of the consumer base, and then enhances the
15. CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA (1997).
16. Jeffrey T. Macher & Barak D. Richman, Organisational Responses to Discontinuous
Innovation: A Case Study Approach, 8 INT’L J. INNOVATION MGMT. 87 (2004).
17. See CHRISTENSEN, supra note 15, at xv–xxiv.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at xvi.
22. See id. at xv.
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product over time.23 The presence of regulation, however, may effectively
prevent disruptive technological improvements from occurring. In a lightly

Performance

Figure 1. Sustaining Innovation and Disruptive Innovation
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Adapted from C.M. Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma (1997).

23. See id. at xxiii.
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regulated market, disruptive innovation may emerge because the low threshold
of mandated requirements allows the introduction of products having only basic
features. (See Figure 2). In a heavily regulated market, however, the
performance threshold is higher: all products must meet mandated
requirements B to enter the market. Central to the theory of disruptive
innovation is that disruptions occur in response to a performance oversupply.24
The performance of the mainstream product exceeds the performance
requirements of the average consumer.25 To the extent that the requirements
established by regulations exceed the requirements of the average consumer,
disruptive innovation cannot occur.

Performance

Figure 2. Sustaining Innovation and Disruptive Innovation in Markets of
Light and Heavy Regulation
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24. See id.
25. Id.
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In addition to the barriers to entry imposed directly by regulation, more
subtle incidental barriers may also exist. Protected by regulation, health care
organizations may use monopoly rents to prevent new business models from
entering the market. In addition, disruptive innovators have limited access to
the regulatory process. A two-person start-up is unlikely to have ready access
to congressional committees or to the senior leadership of a regulatory body.
Thus, rather than consider proposals for new business models that operate at
the margins of existing regulations, Congress, regulatory bodies, and industry
concentrate their efforts on advancing incremental changes in the status quo.
Furthermore, regulatory bodies typically deal with a narrowly defined question.
The overall effect of a particular decision on the evolution of the marketplace is
not considered. Finally, the net impact of the rules on efficiency and quality in
the marketplace is not evaluated.
Are there examples of disruptive innovation in health care? In its purest
form, capitation26 has the hallmarks of a disruptive innovation.27 Capitation
aims to provide basic, integrated care to less-demanding customers (that is,
healthier patients) at a lower cost.28 In theory, capitation disrupts the
relationship between the patient and a highly specialized, fragmented system by
offering a single point of contact at a lower price.29 As a business model,
capitation is distinct from traditional fee-for-service medicine in that it permits
the transfer of resources among providers so that the cost of service
improvements (for example, home care for asthma) can be offset by gains in
efficiency (for example, fewer hospitalizations and emergency department
visits).30
As implemented through managed-care programs, however, capitation has
failed to achieve the gains associated with disruptive innovation. Although
managed care appeared initially to control health care expenses, costs are again
on the rise.31 Compliance with evidence-based guidelines32 is comparable in

26. Here, “capitation” refers to a specific payment mechanism by which a provider is paid a fixed
amount, determined in advance, for the care of an individual or group for a prespecified period of time,
regardless of the type or number of services actually provided. By contrast, “managed care” refers to a
type of organizational framework for the provision of health insurance, in which capitation is one
commonly used mechanism for controlling health care costs.
27. Clayton M. Christensen, Richard Bohmer & John Kenagy, Will Disruptive Innovations Cure
Health Care?, HARV. BUS. REV., Sep.–Oct., 2000, at 102.
28. See id. at 104.
29. See id. at 104–05.
30. See Donald M. Berwick, Part 5: Payment by Capitation and the Quality of Care, 335 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 1227, 1228–30 (1996).
31. See Oberlander, supra note 2; Bradley C. Strunk, Paul B. Ginsburg & Jon R. Gabel, Tracking
Health Care Costs, 2001 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCLUSIVES) W39, W39; Christopher Hogan, Paul B.
Ginsburg & Jon R. Gabel, Tracking Health Care Costs: Inflation Returns, HEALTH AFF., Nov.–Dec.
2000, at 217, 217.
32. Evidence-based guidelines are systematically developed statements that define standards of
care based on sound scientific research. See Patrick J. O’Connor, Adding Value to Evidence-Based
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managed-care and non-managed-care settings.33 Consumer satisfaction is
consistently lower in managed-care settings, as compared to non-managed-care
settings.34 In sum, few would argue that managed care satisfies the needs of the
majority of consumers in the marketplace by offering a product of markedly
higher quality at a lower cost.
Christensen argues that disruptive innovation has occurred in selected
pockets of health care, citing home-based blood-glucose self-monitoring for
patients with diabetes, coronary angioplasty for the treatment of coronaryartery disease, and the emergence of nurse practitioners as examples.35 In these
cases, Christensen asserts, the innovation allowed tasks that historically could
be performed only by specialists in centralized locations to be performed by a
larger, less-skilled group in a more convenient, less-expensive setting.36
Moreover, by enabling less-costly providers (even patients themselves) to
address specific health care needs, these innovations increased efficiency and
access without compromising quality.37
Why has managed care failed as a disruptive innovation while home glucose
monitoring, coronary angioplasty, and the nurse-practitioner model have
succeeded? One might argue that none of these “successful” innovations is
truly disruptive at the market level. None has fundamentally changed the
system of primary care or fostered the development of new and innovative
models of health care delivery. Instead, technology has added to the existing
system, resulting in increased costs with uncertain consequences for quality.38
Physicians supervise nurse practitioners and, in most markets, payment
regulations restrict nurse practitioners to a primary-care role.39 Although
patients monitor their blood glucose, there is no real-time interface with the
physician to integrate the resulting data into treatment strategies. Finally,
angioplasty relies on the same hospital-based business model as does cardiac
surgery; the procedure is simply performed by a cardiologist rather than a
cardiac surgeon.
An alternative argument is that disruptive innovations that succeed in health
care do so because they face fewer regulatory barriers. To some degree,

Clinical Guidelines, 294 JAMA 741, 741–43 (2006) (describing evidence-based clinical practice
guidelines and their role in quality-improvement initiatives).
33. See Robert H. Miller & Harold S. Luft, HMO Plan Performance Update: An Analysis of the
Literature, 1997–2001, HEALTH AFF., July–Aug. 2002, at 63 [hereinafter HMO Performance]; Robert
H. Miller & Harold S. Luft, Does Managed Care Lead to Better or Worse Quality of Care?, HEALTH
AFF., Sep.–Oct. 1997, at 7.
34. HMO Performance, supra note 33, at 63.
35. See Christensen, supra note 27, at 106–08.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See John M. Eisenberg et al., Subtituting Diagnostic Services: New Tests Only Partly Replace
Older Ones, 262 JAMA 1196, 1196 (1989) (concluding that new systems take place alongside, rather
than replace, older ones).
39. See Richard A. Cooper, Tim Henderson & Craig L. Dietrich, Roles of Nonphysician Clinicians
as Autonomous Providers of Patient Care, 280 JAMA 795 (1998).
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regulation may initially have protected the managed-care market.
By
exempting self-insured, employer-sponsored benefit plans from state regulation,
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 197440 effectively created a
favorable climate for the expansion of managed-care programs.41 Rather than
evolve as a distinct business model, however, managed care developed as an
extension of existing insurance networks and their nonexclusive relationships
with multiple providers. The corporate practice of medicine and restrictive
state laws precluded the evolution of truly new models of service delivery in
many states.42 As managed care grew rapidly throughout the 1990s, however,
criticisms of managed care led to the introduction of more than a thousand
pieces of legislation at the federal and state levels addressing consumer
protection in managed-care settings.43 From January to July 1996 alone, state
legislatures introduced more than 400 bills to regulate managed-care
programs.44 Over time, then, managed care has come to look less like a new and
distinct business model, and more like a close cousin of the indemnity insurance
model that spawned the innovation.
IV
DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION IN THE DELIVERY OF PRIMARY CARE
The delivery of primary care has changed fundamentally over the past three
decades. Throughout the 1970s, most patients experienced primary care in the
form of “Marcus Welby medicine.” The patient visited the primary care
physician’s private office for medical care or, if the patient was too ill, the
physician visited the patient at home. The physician spent as much time as
necessary to make the initial diagnosis and then coordinated the care of chronic
conditions.
Over time, the practice of medicine became increasingly
specialized, and the use of high-end technology flourished.
Although
specialization and new technologies served the needs of a profitable sector of
the market, the fragmentation of service delivery made health care less
convenient for patients with basic needs. In the lexicon of disruptive innovation
theory, increasing specialization and reliance on technology represent
sustaining innovations—changes that move primary care further along the same
performance trajectory at progressively higher cost.
How might disruptive innovation transform the delivery of primary care?
The example of diabetes care describes a hypothetical system of care with the
potential to disrupt the primary-care market:

40. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2000).
41. PETER D. JACOBSON, STRANGERS IN THE NIGHT: LAW AND MEDICINE IN THE MANAGED
CARE ERA 11 (2002).
42. See id. at 60.
43. Robert J. Blendon et al., Understanding the Managed Care Backlash, HEALTH AFF., July–Aug.
1998, at 80.
44. Tracy E. Miller, Managed Care Regulation: In the Laboratory of the States, 278 JAMA 1102,
1102 (1997).
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Diabetes mellitus affects approximately eighteen million people in the
United States, or about six percent of the population.45 Diabetes care is often
suboptimal, despite simple diagnostic criteria and effective treatment options.
Although treatment guidelines from the American Diabetes Association are
readily available and widely accepted, less than five percent of patients with
diabetes receive basic care that conforms to those guidelines.46 The clinical
benefits of good glycemic control in patients with diabetes are well established.47
Economic data suggest, moreover, that the cost of poor glycemic control may be
substantial,48 far surpassing the additional resources required for closer
monitoring, increased patient education, greater clinical or telephone contact,
and higher drug costs.49 Despite these data, studies from a wide variety of
practice settings confirm that glycemic control is suboptimal in most patients
with diabetes.50
While physician education51 and patient compliance52 may account for some
of the problem, “system” factors likely drive the low figures. Patients monitor
their glucose, but there is no real-time interface with the physician to integrate
the resulting data into treatment strategies. The acute symptoms and concerns

45. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, NATIONAL DIABETES FACT SHEET:
UNITED STATES 4 (2003), available at http://www.cdc.gov/diabetes/pubs/pdf/ndfs_2003.pdf.
46. See Gloria L. Beckles, et al., Population-Based Assessment of the Level of Care Among Adults
with Diabetes in the U.S., 21 DIABETES CARE 1432 (1998).
47. See, e.g., The Diabetes Control and Complications Trial Research Group, The Effect of
Intensive Treatment of Diabetes on the Development and Progression of Long-Term Complications in
Insulin-Dependent Diabetes Mellitus, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 977 (1993) [hereinafter Intensive
Treatment] (concluding that intensive therapy effectively delays the onset and slows the progression of
diabetic retinopathy, nephropathy, and neuropathy in patients with insulin-dependent diabetes
mellitus); American Diabetes Association, Standards of Medical Care for Patients with Diabetes
Mellitus, 20 DIABETES CARE S5 (1997) [hereinafter Diabetes Standards] (summarizing the standards of
care for patients with diabetes and the benefits associated with optimal glycemic control); Andrzej S.
Krolewski et al., Glycosylated Hemoglobin and the Risk of Microalbuminuria in Patients with InsulinDependent Diabetes Mellitus, 332 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1251 (1995) (establishing that poor glycemic
control abruptly increases the risk of microalbuminuria, the first manifestation of diabetic
nephropathy); GianCarlo Viberti, Editorial, A Glycemic Threshhold for Diabetec Complications?, 332
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1293 (1995); U.K. Prospective Diabetes Study (UKPDS) Group, Intensive BloodGlucose Control with Sulphonylureas or Insulin Compared with Conventional Treatment and Risk of
Complications in Patients with Type 2 Diabetes (UKPDS 33), 352 LANCET 837 (1998) (concluding that
intensive glycemic control reduces the incidence of microvascular complications).
48. See Todd P. Gilmer et al., The Cost to Health Plans of Poor Glycemic Control, 20 DIABETES
CARE 1847 (1997).
49. See The Diabetes Control and Complications Trial Research Group, Resource Utilization and
Costs of Care in the Diabetes Control and Complications Trial, 18 DIABETES CARE 1468, 1478 (1995).
50. See Jinan B. Saaddine, et al., Improvements in Diabetes Processes of Care and Intermediate
Outcomes, 144 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 469 (2006) (showing, based on data from the Behavioral Risk
Factor Surveillance System, that one in five patients with diabetes has poor glycemic control).
51. See Sean R. Tunis et al., Internists' Attitudes About Clinical Practice Guidelines, 120 ANNALS
INTERNAL MED. 956, 956 (1994) (concluding that many physicians were concerned about the
guidelines’ possible effects on clinical autonomy, costs, and satisfaction with clinical practice).
52. See David G. Marrero et al., Nutrition Management of Type 2 Diabetes by Primary Care
Physicians: Reported Uses and Barriers, 15 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 818, 818 (2000) (detailing patientcentered barriers to effective nutrition therapy).
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that give rise to an office visit may crowd out the relatively less-urgent need to
manage blood-glucose levels optimally.53
Consider a hypothetical innovation for managing the care of patients with
diabetes: a home glucose monitoring system that electronically transmits daily
glucose levels to a database in the physician’s office.54 A companion software
package automatically charts glucose levels over time. Using evidence-based
guidelines, the software flags alarming trends in glucose levels and generates
printed reports that trigger intervention by a health care provider. The specific
intervention would depend upon the trend, and might range from an e-mail
exchange to a telephone “check-up” to an office visit with the primary-care
provider. In the disruptive-innovation framework, the innovation provides a
basic, integrated product (an enhanced blood-glucose monitoring system) to
less-demanding consumers (outpatients with diabetes, rather than hospitalized
or acutely ill patients) at a lower cost (regular information is transmitted
between patients and physicians without the cost and inconvenience of an office
visit).
Initially, the basic product might appeal only to a small number of
physicians and consumers. Over time, technology vendors would likely enter
the market to enhance the system in a variety of ways. For example, an
enhanced reporting module might be added to enable aggregation of data into
cohorts defined by payer, employer, or disease severity. In addition, the standalone database might be linked to the office-based electronic medical record or
scheduling system so that evidence-based practice guidelines, embedded in the
system, could fuel reminders for primary-care teams. As the infrastructure
costs would likely be prohibitive for solo- or small-group practices,
“cooperatives” might emerge to allow small physician groups to achieve
economies of scale. Alternatively, third-party vendors might bundle hardware,
software, and technical support as a product for solo- and small-group practices.
These approaches could lead to new ways of organizing providers around
expensive capital equipment. Again, in a disruptive-innovation framework,
these and other enhancements would move the disruptive product along the
performance trajectory and enable it to eventually capture a significant portion
of the market.
Perhaps surprisingly, under the current regulatory structure there are
substantial disincentives to developing and adopting innovations like the one
imagined above. First, there is no reimbursement mechanism for investments in
information infrastructure. Although the basic innovation might be attractive
for a subset of technology-savvy and technology-seeking physicians, continued
implementation would likely depend on the widespread presence of an

53. Thomas Bodenheimer, Edward. H. Wagner & Kevin Grumbach, Improving Primary Care for
Patients with Chronic Illness, 288 JAMA 1775, 1775 (2002).
54. Telemetric, home-based blood glucose monitoring devices have emerged in recent years,
although they are not as automated as the hypothetical device we describe. See, e.g. , MetrikLink® at
http://www.imetrikus.com/prod_ML.asp (last visited Aug. 22, 2006).
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infrastructure that supports an electronic medical record. Under the current
encounter-based reimbursement system, providers have little incentive to
acquire technologies that enhance service but do not generate revenue.55
Physicians are not able to bill for technology directly, or they are not able to
share in the benefit of the service—improved efficiency and quality for patients
reduces revenue for providers. Second, the hypothetical innovation might
increase demand for unbilled, informal communications between patients and
care providers while decreasing the demand for acute office visits. Again, the
current system reimburses for office visits, not informal exchanges (for example,
telephone conversations or e-mail exchanges). Physicians who adopt the
innovation would likely see their revenues decline.
V
CONCLUSION: THE CHALLENGE OF REGULATION
The regulatory framework that governs the U.S. health care system is
flawed. Complex and highly detailed regulations increase costs through
paperwork, duplication of effort, and mandated inefficiency. In addition, and
perhaps more significantly, the regulatory framework escalates costs by stifling
innovation in service delivery. The example provided here is hypothetical, but
it aptly describes the kind of quality-enhancing, lower-cost innovation that may
never reach the market under the current regulatory structure.
The current structure may be inhospitable to innovation because regulators
do their jobs extremely well; that is, they develop regulations that address
narrowly defined program goals. The role of the regulator is analagous to the
role of the manager in Christensen’s framework.56 Managers who listen
carefully to consumers successfully push products along the performance
trajectory through sustaining innovations. In a competitive market, this
practice creates a situation ripe for disruptive innovation. Regulators fine-tune
regulations and, similarly, force a product along a performance trajectory.
Disruptive innovation cannot occur, however, because a new product is
prohibited from entering below the threshold established by the regulation.
What regulators do not do is evaluate how regulations affect overarching
goals for quality and efficiency in the marketplace. In addition, although
forgone disruptive innovation is a substantial opportunity cost of regulation,
regulatory bodies neither acknowledge the cost nor adjust for it in their
analyses of the costs and benefits of new regulations. Finally, the public
rulemaking process closely attunes regulators to the interests of majority
stakeholders, not to the interests of isolated innovators.

55. See Edward H. Shortliffe, Strategic Action in Health Information Technology: Why the Obvious
Has Taken So Long, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1222, 1223–29 (2005) (describing financial and structural barriers
to widespread adoption of information technology in health care).
56. See CHRISTENSEN, supra note 15, at xiv–xxiv.
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Making the regulatory environment more hospitable to innovation will not
be a trivial task. Disruptive innovations cannot be identified prospectively, so
systematically collecting basic information on all innovations may help us to
understand the circumstances that are most (or least) hospitable to disruptive
innovation. At a minimum, we should begin to catalog innovations as they
arise. In addition, the regulatory process should incorporate the opportunity
costs of forgone disruptive innovation in the calculation of the costs of
regulation. While imprecise, this “thumb on the scale” would have the desired
effect of reducing the net benefit of many proposed regulations. Finally, and
more fundamentally, a regulatory process that stifles innovation and increases
costs calls into question the role of the government in a private health care
system. A careful examination of the regulatory process and its consequences
may be in order.
Disruptive innovation theory provides one lens through which to describe
how regulations may stifle innovation and increase costs. Can disruptive
innovation deliver better quality and lower cost over time, and does the
regulatory structure preclude achievement of these goals? Empirical work is
essential and might include reexamining the fundamental theory of regulation
and its application to health care, quantifying the cost of regulation to the
health care system, and using game theory to understand how well alternative
regulatory structures might accommodate innovation. To be clear, we do not
propose deregulation of the health care market. Regulations are necessary to
assure basic protections, prevent fraud, maintain and promote access to care,
and provide governing direction for large public programs. Rather, we present
one way of understanding how the current system of regulation often precludes
cost-saving, quality-enhancing innovations from reaching the market. To the
extent that disruptive innovation cannot occur, health care will continue on a
high-cost trajectory without commensurate gains in quality.

